The tragedy of Europe is that Germany is not against Russia and the EU is not against Germany. A Russian invasion of Ukraine will have many losers. I expect that apart from Ukraine itself, the EU will be one of the biggest losers.
If Russia invades Ukraine, it will inadvertently expose Europe’s internal divisions. Unintentionally, because I don’t think that’s Vladimir Putin’s main goal. Russia’s president is concerned that color revolutions in Russia, as he calls them, may eventually seep into Russian politics itself.
It is, of course, absurd to suggest that NATO could invade Russia. The threat to Russia is much more subtle, but no less real. There is not much the US can offer to ease Putin’s paranoia. He wants a political buffer zone – and Ukraine and Belarus are definitely part of that zone.
What Russia always does – and the EU almost never does – is act on its own definition of strategic interests, whatever one might think of that definition. What defines strategy is the pursuit of a long-term goal and the willingness to pay a short-term price.
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European and especially German foreign policy is not strategic in the sense that it is geared towards short-term gain. Anyone who puts car exports in the foreground leaves fewer degrees of freedom for other interests – human rights, climate change, security of supply, technology leadership.
If Russia invades, Germany and other European countries could eventually run out of gas. That would depend on how energy goes into this conflict.
Russia could close Suwalki Gap
Germany put itself in this position because the various governments failed to develop a coherent energy policy. Three nuclear power plants went offline in early 2022. The last three remaining will be shut down at the end of the year. With the Greens in government, I see no chance of a policy reversal.
Scholz: “Are ready for a serious dialogue with Russia on security issues”
The new coalition has ambitious plans for investing in renewable energy – but the math doesn’t add up. The energy transition requires unprecedented investments in modern gas-fired power plants as an interim solution.
That means, first of all, Russian gas. It’s possible that the Greens will riot over Nord Stream 2, but I don’t think they’ll leave the government over a pipeline — and sacrifice their renewable energy investment program. The deal is closed.
If Russia invades, it’s a matter of appearances and reality. Russia has no interest in occupying all of Ukraine. It will never invade a NATO country and try to occupy it.
My concern is that it may eventually decide to close the Suwalki Gap, the stretch of land on the Polish-Lithuanian border that separates the Russian province of Kaliningrad from Belarus.
The Suwalki Gap would be separated by the Polish-Lithuanian border in the event of a political union with Belarus and Russia.
This effectively turns the border region into a Russian puppet state. This would give Russia direct land access to the southern Baltic Sea and drive a wedge into the EU. The Baltic states would be geographically isolated from the EU at this point and surrounded on all sides by Russia. This is the scenario depicted on our hypothetical map above.
If Russia invades, it could also try to expand its military control over the Black Sea. Russia could also slice through the Ukrainian territories separating it from Transnistria, the Russian-speaking province in eastern Moldova, another potential trouble spot.
Germany will appease
If Russia invades, Germany will appease. Germany will push for minimal sanctions – only those that do not hurt German exports. It will veto any proposal to cut Russia off from the Swift payments system, should such a proposal ever be made.
Nord Stream 2 is safe because neither the EU nor the Biden government want to upset the Germans. A Republican majority after this year’s midterm elections could change U.S. policy, but by then the gas will already be flowing.
When Russia invades, Europeans will complain that they are not invited to the various diplomatic tables. Sitting at tables is a big thing in Europe.
You will hear many debates about minor issues, such as majority decisions in the Council on foreign policy. What is not up for debate is an increase in defense spending.
If Russia to Ukraine marched in, no one will oppose the country. And no one will mess with the pacifiers. That’s what happens when you let others do the strategic thinking.
The author is director of www.eurointelligence.com
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