Stop the war: Putin needs a way to end the conflict while saving face.
(Photo: imago images/NurPhoto)
When historians one day describe the history of the Ukraine crisis, they will probably point to the fact that shortly before the moment of the greatest confrontation, Netflix released its own production “Munich”. The lavishly staged feature film about the 1938 Munich Conference is likely to reach more people than most editorials and has a clear message: making concessions to aggressors takes revenge.
They feel encouraged by this and only understand the language of strength.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is of course not comparable to Adolf Hitler. And yet the spirit of Munich runs through the pattern of arguments in Western Ukraine policy.
There is talk of NATO and the EU having to drive up the political price that Russia would have to pay for an invasion of Ukraine as high as possible. So high that Putin sees the pointlessness of his troop deployment at the border and sends the soldiers home.
Top jobs of the day
Find the best jobs now and
be notified by email.
A clear edge against the aggressor, just as it should have been shown in Munich back then.
Putin wants to increase the national greatness of Russia
This notion is naïve and dangerous. As in most countries in the world, foreign policy in Russia is largely driven by domestic political motives. Behind Putin’s march is his promise to his own people to increase Russia’s national greatness.
If Putin caves in to Western threats of sanctions and withdraws his soldiers, he will jeopardize his reputation as a restorer of Russian glory – which in turn is an important pillar of his continued power.
(Photo: Burkhard Mohr)
In the Ukraine conflict, the West must therefore distinguish more clearly than before between strategy and tactics. Strategically, the goal is clear: the EU and NATO should not tolerate a zone of limited sovereignty in Eastern Europe in which states like Ukraine can no longer freely decide on the alliances they join or stay away from.
There is no way the West can meet this central demand of Putin. How beneficial NATO membership is for the security of the Baltic states, for example, is shown impressively enough by Russia’s threatening gestures towards Kiev.
Diplomatic channels are now in demand
At the tactical level, however, it can be wise not to threaten sanctions loudly in speeches or interviews, but rather confidentially through diplomatic channels. And instead to consider: What concessions can the West offer publicly that do not undermine its own strategic position, but allow Putin a face-saving retreat?
For example, a joint declaration by NATO and Ukraine that there are no plans for Ukraine to join the military alliance in the coming years would be conceivable, provided the country’s sovereignty is not threatened.
The West could combine this moratorium with an invitation to a disarmament conference for Eastern Europe – and thus at least rhetorically accommodate Russia’s desire for NATO troops to be withdrawn from the region.
Nothing would be lost strategically compared to the status quo. Meanwhile, Putin could announce in Moscow that his troop deployment has forced the West to the negotiating table – and withdraw his soldiers face-saving.
More: “Unmistakable signal” to the world: USA move 2000 soldiers to Germany and Poland