Not delivering weapons to crisis areas is like “like selling meat only to vegetarians”. This was one of the famous Sottisen by Franz-Josef Strauss. On the one hand, of course, the butcher’s son and chief lobbyist for the armaments location Bavaria spoke, but on the other hand, Strauss had a point in that there can’t be just one answer to such strategic questions as arms deliveries.
Some conflicts are certainly fueled by arms shipments, but then again, as so often, it depends on the situation – and this strategic analysis is the subject of game theory.
One of the first historical applications of game theory were models of the American RAND Corporation after World War II, which investigated whether and under what circumstances nuclear deterrence can provide a stable equilibrium. Stable means that neither side can gain a better position through direct aggression against the other side.
The result of the analysis can be summed up as follows: nuclear deterrence works when, on the one hand, rational actors oppose each other. In addition, the other side must believe or consider it sufficiently probable that their nuclear weapons would actually be used in a defensive situation. The latter is not at all easy to achieve, because both sides know that one actually only possesses nuclear weapons in order never to have to use them. Very clear strategic signals, stringent communication, and building reputation and credibility are the only way to create this balance.
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Military conflicts are so-called sequential games in which one actor acts and the other reacts. The strategic challenge is to anticipate the other side’s reaction and have the other anticipate your own reaction, so that it is clear that any aggression will lead to the worst (or at least not the best) conceivable outcome for the other side.
In conflicts between players playing in the same weight class, this is relatively easy to achieve. No one today would seriously doubt that an open conflict between major geopolitical powers would lead to the worst possible outcome for everyone involved.
However, if the balance of power is very asymmetrical and the stronger player makes regular use of his or her strength, it’s a completely different “game”. Russia and Ukraine do not have a symmetrical balance of power, and Putin uses Russia’s strength to fill any power vacuum. How do you prevent such conflicts from escalating? You have to ensure that cooperative behavior becomes more attractive to the more aggressive player and that the price of uncooperative behavior increases.
Who is currently ashamed of Germany
In the case of Russia, for example, a ten-year moratorium on NATO expansion could be a way of making cooperative behavior more attractive. The counterpart to this is to make Russian aggression unattractive by credibly announcing relevant economic or military retaliation.
Against this background, those who read international media are currently ashamed of our country and our government. I do not even condemn the fact that the federal government itself does not want to supply arms to Ukraine. Ukraine is not a NATO country. It is legitimate not to become involved in an armed conflict.
Marcus Schreiber is a founding partner and chief executive officer at TWS Partners. He has many years of experience in strategic purchasing and broad industry know-how. His focus is on strategic purchasing, applied industrial economics and market design. He also supports companies in applying game theory knowledge in complex procurement decisions.
On the other hand, it is completely unacceptable to stop arms deliveries from the Baltic states (such as howitzers from GDR stocks) and thus demonstrate not only one’s own aversion to conflict, but also complete incapacity for conflict.
Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht has offered Ukraine the delivery of 5,000 helmets in the best tradition of symbolic politics in the Federal Republic. What Waldimir Putin will read from this offer is: “The Germans and ultimately the Europeans will not do anything that even remotely hurts them. I, Putin, have carte blanche and will at most be punished symbolically.”
China is looking closely at what a US guarantee of the inviolability of Ukraine’s borders is worth
Mrs. Lambrecht essentially has three tasks: to ensure the defense capability of the Bundeswehr, to signal its readiness for defense and to make Germany and the Bundeswehr attractive as partners for alliances. Lambrecht did not have time for task 1. In tasks 2 and 3, however, she has already caused lasting damage and endangered peace in Europe.
With enough cynicism, we could abandon Ukraine to a 19th-century-style Russian sphere of influence. But the “game” does not end at the Ukrainian border. It is also a replay game. Unwillingness to act in Ukraine makes it much more likely that the Baltic states will then be on Putin’s agenda. Then there would be a NATO alliance and the price of sending a credible signal would be much higher. We complain that the US government is negotiating the European security architecture with the Russians “over the heads of the Europeans”. I’m so glad that the current US administration understands that Ukraine is far from over. The Chinese will also take a very close look at what a US guarantee of the inviolability of Ukraine’s borders is worth.
The chief opportunist in the Munich State Chancellery, Markus Söder, said in an interview with the FAS that sanctions are not a suitable way “because they would harm us”. Exactly the opposite is true! We are only credible if we are willing to accept painful disadvantages.
Putin’s great weapon against Western Europe is the gas tap
I give the Greens and FDP credit for having a clear moral stance on Ukraine and being willing to sacrifice Nord Stream 2. It would have been really effective not to shut down the three nuclear power plants on January 1, to signal that they are prepared to accept an energy crisis in the event of Russian aggression and – no matter which way – not a cubic meter of gas obtainable from Russia. Especially when the Greens are willing to temporarily sacrifice the golden calf of the nuclear phase-out, they create maximum credibility.
Russia’s gas tap is Putin’s great weapon against Western Europe. Turning it on yourself takes the fright out of the whole thing. Personally, I’m ready to sit at my desk in a ski suit for the next three years.
More: Gas supplies below critical limit