There is even talk of possible regressions in the global increase in prosperity, no wonder given the numerous regional conflicts and the ongoing brutal Russian war of aggression in Ukraine.
In this situation, the national security strategy promised by the federal government in the coalition agreement is overdue! In concrete terms, the coalition agreement states: “We want Germany to invest three percent of its gross domestic product in international trade in the long term in the interests of a networked and inclusive approach, thereby strengthening its diplomacy and development policy and fulfilling its commitments made in NATO.”
With this self-imposed task of presenting a national security strategy, the federal government is abandoning the previous practice of occasional white papers on security policy and is approaching the practice that has been practiced for a long time by comparable partners such as France or the USA.
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As welcome as the announcement of the security strategy is, the question of implementing the objectives and projects laid down in the strategy is just as urgent. If this strategy is not accompanied by a fully competent “National Security Council” responsible for implementation and the appropriate underpinning, then it will hardly be worth the paper it is written on.
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The following are the reasons why the existing Federal Security Council (BSR) should either be massively reinforced or replaced by a new National Security Council:
First: At the latest with the “turning point” announced by Chancellor Scholz on February 27, 2022, it became clear that the federal government had no tools at its disposal to diagnose strategic vulnerabilities in our energy policy or comprehensive strategies for dealing with authoritarian regimes such as Russia or China to develop.
Towards the end of 2021, one department of the federal government was still able to maintain the assertion that the commissioning of Nord Stream 2 would not pose any further problems.
A Federal Security Council with comprehensive responsibility would be expected not only to present the energy policy facts and interdependencies relentlessly, but also to evaluate the foreign policy damage caused by Berlin ignoring warnings from a large number of partners over the years .
“But the federal government can no longer afford to compete with the “German vote””
Secondly, acting with one voice on foreign and European policy has often been difficult in the past when it came to cooperation between two coalition partners. These difficulties are even more evident in the current traffic light coalition of three, which was to be expected.
However, the federal government can no longer afford to occasionally appear in Brussels with the so-called “German vote”, i.e. without a clear stance in the face of internal coalition differences. The Federal Security Council must be the instrument with which the Federal Government ensures that a clear opinion is expressed to the outside world with a clear voice.
Third: In the past, a classic objection to a strong Federal Security Council located in the Federal Chancellery was that this would weaken the departmental responsibility of the Federal Foreign Office in favor of the Chancellery. Since the Lisbon Treaty, this argument can no longer be put forward seriously. This stipulates that the foreign ministers will no longer take part in meetings of the European Council as they used to.
It is not only because of this provision that power has been concentrated in the respective government headquarters in all European capitals, which means that some foreign ministers find out from the press what their own head of government has just decided. A BSR with comprehensive responsibility and staffed with specialists from all relevant departments could be more helpful for the departments in order to ensure full and early involvement.
“Coordination between foreign policy objectives and the allocation of development funds is of the utmost urgency”
Fourth: The Federal Security Council or National Security Council would have to ensure that the European and foreign policy priorities laid down in the coalition agreement are not lost sight of. For example, the coalition agreement states: “We advocate increased cooperation between national armies and EU members who are willing to integrate, especially in terms of training, skills, operations and equipment, as already planned by Germany and France, for example.”
It has not yet become clear to what extent this correct objective was taken into account in the planning for the use of the 100 billion special fund for defense.
Watching over this would be just as much a task for the National Security Council as a much closer dovetailing of foreign and development policy priorities. An ongoing intensive coordination in the BSR between foreign policy objectives and the allocation of development funds is of the utmost urgency.
When Chancellor Olaf Scholz is in Davos next week, his appearance will generate all the more positive reactions the more clearly he can explain that his coalition represents a foreign and security policy from a single source. The national security strategy and the implementation tools proposed here can give this claim credibility and assertiveness.
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