“The European perspective is neglected”

Mr. Ischinger, you have been calling for a national security strategy for a long time. After heated debates, the coalition has now delivered. What do you think of the result?
First of all, it is good that the document is now available, albeit with a delay. It is also good that the ministries are now trying to find a common approach. But integrated security encompasses a great deal, so the paper covers a large number of topics and goals – albeit without precise definitions of the means and methods of implementation.

There’s room for improvement. So a pretty good first serve. It is important that this does not remain a flash in the pan, but is repeated regularly and also widely discussed in the Bundestag.

>> Read here: Download Security Strategy Paper

That sounds very benevolent, CDU boss Merz called the strategy paper “content bloodless, strategically irrelevant and uncoordinated in terms of foreign policy”. Is he exaggerating?
Yes, that’s a bit of an exaggeration, but there are undoubtedly weaknesses. My biggest point of criticism: In my opinion, the European perspective is neglected. With the 100 billion special funds for the Bundeswehr, for example, it would have to be clearly defined which funds should be used for European military research, development and production purposes.

I’m missing approaches that would turn the European Union into a construct capable of acting militarily and in terms of foreign policy.

In other words, I am missing approaches that would turn the European Union into a construct capable of acting militarily and in terms of foreign policy. Germany has a duty here.

Does that mean that Berlin is again giving the impression of going it alone?
In any case, it would have been quite easy to say that we would draw up a draft and then first discuss it with the most important European allies to ensure that their concerns and needs were taken into account. In addition, there is the signal that Berlin could not be so serious about the two percent target for defense.

The goal is once again laid down in the current strategy. Another paper tiger?
You see, from the partner’s point of view, the two percent question is a litmus test of how serious Berlin is. But the debate about budget planning alone, as far as I know it, is not exactly confidence-inspiring. Here, the 100 billion euros in special funds will obviously be included in the budget until the two percent is reached.

But then the special fund may be used up within two years. This could give the impression that the federal government is not taking the turning point so seriously after all.

You have repeatedly called for a National Security Council based on the US model to be an essential part of the security strategy. But he won’t come. Why is such advice so important?
My concern is that implementing any strategy in a three-party coalition is inherently complex. If, as is the case here, the instruments for forward-looking, systematic and coordinated implementation are missing, the result will remain unsatisfactory because every ministry will insist on the departmental principle. The Federal Government’s Chief Risk Officer – there won’t be one like that. But we need one.

The Security Council failed due to the conflict between the Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry, both of which claimed the location of the Council for themselves. What do you say about the fact that conflicts of jurisdiction also play an important role in questions of national security?
I very much regret that this conflict of competences arose at all – especially since it is unnecessary. The Federal Security Council (BSR), which has existed for decades, was and is of course based in the Chancellery. That is the – constitutionally correct and politically sensible – precedent.

Incidentally, Scholz could easily expand the BSR’s staff and appoint his foreign policy adviser as head, then he would almost have the National Security Council. But it’s not his style to force it.

>> Read here: Germany urgently needs a real national security council – for four reasons

Are such conflicts also due to the fact that the foreign minister tends to stand for a value-based foreign policy and the chancellor tends to follow the realpolitik line?
No. From my point of view, it is more about questions of responsibility than about more fundamental questions of values.

Which of the two approaches do you think is the smarter one in relation to China?
We are still waiting for a special China strategy. The crucial point here is: speaking to China with a clear European voice. With national China strategies, the EU is making it all too easy for China to operate divide et impera! We urgently need an EU-China strategy. Macron’s recent visit to Beijing made that abundantly clear to us…

… the French President spoke at the time of Europe being equidistant from Washington and Beijing. Do you think the Europeans should join the American containment strategy or should they go their own way?
Our China interests are not congruent with America’s. That is why we need a very high-level set of transatlantic China consultation instruments between the EU and the USA if we want the USA to take us seriously and not bulldoze us over China or Taiwan.

“China is at least partly a systemic rival”

Equidistance, however, would be completely wrong: the USA is our partner, China is at least partly a systemic rival.

But Berlin in particular still tends to regard Beijing as a partner. Was it a mistake for the Europeans to conclude an investment agreement that is currently blocked under pressure from ex-Chancellor Merkel? And should Europe continue to strive for one?
Basically, that wasn’t a bad idea. Our problem now is the EU Parliament. If it were to ratify the agreement despite the known shortcomings, including in the area of ​​human rights, that would certainly be a strategically sensible step. But we’re a long way from that.

Do you think the German “change through trade” approach, which characterized both Russia and China relations, is completely discredited?
No, but we have to lower expectations. The hope that China would develop into a “responsible stakeholder” through trade, in the sense of Western concepts of order, has obviously not been fulfilled. China is pursuing its own regulatory goals. Nevertheless, trade is always helpful, not only because it also opens up political communication channels and keeps them open.

Mr. Ischinger, thank you very much for the interview.

Jens Münchrath asked the questions.

More: Sharp tones towards China – the federal government decides on a national security strategy for the first time