Russia’s war fuels tech alliance between Europe and the US

The EU and the USA want to redesign the international rules for the use of technology and are currently meeting in Paris at the second Trade and Technology Council (TTC). The forum, which was launched last autumn, is currently the most important transatlantic economic project.

It aims to create the basis for a Euro-Atlantic power center and a digital world based on democratic values.

But that has changed. Shaken up by the Russian attack on Ukraine, the partners are moving closer together. The TTC is developing into a systemic partnership for global tech governance between democratic states.

How powerful it is is already evident: Immediately after the start of the war, the EU and the USA used the TTC instruments to limit Russia’s technology exports and access to critical technologies.

Sanctions on semiconductors are likely to see Russia’s tech sector atrophy for lack of chips. Industries affected include aviation, data centers, artificial intelligence (AI), cloud technology, industrial control systems and military equipment.

In 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that a country leading in AI would be the “ruler of the world.” With limited Russian access to semiconductors, the EU and US have now marginalized Russia in the AI ​​space.

>>Read here: How Europe and the US are fighting back against Chinese technology standards

Originally, the TTC was created to counter China’s technological and geoeconomic ambitions. However, the war in Ukraine shifted the focus.

Efforts by TTC partners to contain Russia’s technological capabilities and secure some sort of democratic autonomy could serve as a test run for how the West intends to respond to China’s systemic technological challenge.

Limiting the authoritarian and digital power of Russia and China is just as important as maintaining an open and pluralistic internet.

The EU and the USA are planning a strategic mutual dependency for critical technologies.

Both have identified weaknesses in semiconductor supply chains exposed by the coronavirus pandemic, US-China competition and a surge in demand.

Intel’s plan to build a chip factory in Magdeburg is part of an effort to diversify its supply chains more geographically and between the US and the EU.

USA and Europe are planning common standards

The EU and the USA are also approaching each other on sensitive fundamental issues – for example with regard to global standards for artificial intelligence. The damage that the AI ​​applications can cause should decide how intensively they have to be tested for approval.

Another example is a privacy convergence to regulate the power of online platforms and disinformation. The EU’s achievements in platform governance inspire admiration and even envy among American politicians, including former President Barack Obama and former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton.

The EU and US are currently considering joint rules to create more transparency and accountability for Facebook, Twitter, Tiktok, Telegram and other major digital platforms.

Transatlantic partners must also consider how to secure access to critical materials like rare earths sourced from countries like Russia and China.

They must also ensure that supply chains only involve countries where democratic rights are respected. This is not the case with solar panels made by forced laborers in labor camps in Xinjiang.

Washington is planning a digital alliance of democracies

The declared goal of the administration of US President Joe Biden is that digital technologies should “strengthen, not weaken” democracy, including privacy, pluralism, minority, LGBTQ and women’s rights.

At Biden’s suggestion, the US, the EU and more than 30 non-EU countries signed a “Declaration on the Future of the Internet”. In it, they advocate that the Internet should be open, free, global and secure and that human rights should be protected in the digital world.

Signatories also include Ukraine and Taiwan. However, major tech powers of the Global South such as South Africa, India, Brazil and even Mexico and South Korea did not join the declaration.

The conviction that a vision for democratic technologies does not find enough approval in the Global South is gaining ground.

Perhaps that is why the EU has reached out to India – one of China’s biggest system rivals in the Indo-Pacific region – to set up a second Trade and Technology Council.

As the undisputed technological power of the Global South, India is a systemically important player. However, EU-India relations will be less predictable and more difficult than the EU-US technological partnership.

However, the EU and the USA are also jointly considering how development aid for digital expansion in the Western Balkans, in Africa and in the post-Soviet region could look like.

Here, too, both sides seem to agree that they want to fight China’s technology mercantilism through Huawei and ZTE in the long term and prevent Chinese network suppliers from dominating the market.

Efforts go beyond 5G to include cloud computing, artificial intelligence, undersea cables, smart city technology, 6G and quantum computing.

The world order needs an update

The outline for the Euro-Atlantic Technology Partnership is in place. There are still stumbling blocks when it comes to sensitive issues such as data protection, the market power of large platforms or standards for artificial intelligence. But at the moment Europe and the USA are well on the way to establishing their tech alliance of democracies.

The world order needs an upgrade. In the Industrial Age, it was ruled by free trade agreements, strict regulations, and contractual alliances.

In the digital age, on the other hand, alliance structures must be dynamic, pragmatic and functional. Governance must go beyond the state and involve users, businesses and civil society.

In short, there must be an ecosystem alliance. The EU and the United States are well on the way to developing this system.

About the author: Tyson Barker heads the Technology and Foreign Policy program of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). His previous positions included senior advisor in the Office of European and Eurasian Relations at the US Department of State.

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