Plea for a new China policy

China has also made it clear that as a system rival, it does not want to and will not be a partner at the same time. In other words: it would be wise to focus in this country. But on what?

For the former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the aspect of pragmatic partnership was always clearly in the foreground of her China policy. But while Beijing is still hoping that this approach will be continued, it is increasingly reaching its limits.

Even if Xi Jinping demonstratively congratulated Olaf Scholz as the first foreign head of state to be chancellor, it seems hardly conceivable that the traffic light coalition with the green foreign minister Annalena Baerbock will continue to give economic interests, for example, the German automotive industry almost unrestricted priority over value-based goals – especially since parts of themselves are meanwhile itself of the German economy, namely the Federation of German Industry, have known about red lines in dealing with authoritarian states when it comes to environmental protection and human rights.

Can Germany stick to its special path?

In addition, Germany’s most important allies have in fact quite clearly abandoned the idea of ​​a partnership with China. Relations with China have cooled noticeably within the EU and particularly in the European Parliament since Brussels and Beijing imposed mutual sanctions in spring 2021.

The USA – first under President Donald Trump, now also under his successor Joe Biden – have long been on a rather confrontational course towards China. Against this background, can Germany hold on to its special path at all?

Last but not least, China’s own behavior does the rest – from persistent human rights violations, especially against the Muslim Uighur minority, to the increasingly aggressive appearance on the outside, in particular the military threats against Taiwan and the massive territorial claims in the South China Sea. In addition, in the economic area, at the heart of German-Chinese relations, local wishes, for example for equal opportunities for investments in the People’s Republic, have long fallen on deaf ears.

In fact, China now seems to be considering some economic decoupling from the West. The partnership idea is still officially valid to this day, especially because global challenges such as climate change, pandemics and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot be mastered without China. In Germany and the EU, however, it is often overlooked that China’s actions on global issues are exclusively guided by its own national interests.

On the other hand: Are the increasingly loudly articulated demands that Germany must make a sharp U-turn in the direction of ideological systemic rivalry with a view to China really expedient? Hardly likely. Because the term “system rival” ultimately indicates that Beijing is stylized as an enemy. But that would run counter to German and European interests. Because in this way the solution of global problems would move even further into the distance.

The Federal Republic should not get caught between all chairs

This strategy would also make little geopolitical sense. At a time when Russia is again intensely rattling its saber and America’s reliability as a guarantee of security seems rather uncertain – just think of a possible re-election of Donald Trump – Germany and the entire EU cannot allow themselves to be hostile to China if they do not want to be between everyone Chairs advised.

In addition to partners and system rivals, the middle way that remains is the competitor’s approach, which is currently hardly discussed, whereby the term should be broadly defined: on the one hand, it should allow a clear, value-based demarcation from China, but on the other hand, it should also open the door to bilateral and multilateral cooperation in its own interest keep the People’s Republic open.

Viewed in this way, “competition” would be neither naive nor overly confrontational. Instead, this middle way would offer a solid basis for a factual and substantive examination of the opportunities and risks of our dealings with Beijing.

While the assessment of China as a system rival also resonates with a good deal of fear, the term competition implies trust in the own strength of Germany and the European Union. In this way, Germany could take account of the general mood among the population that it would act tougher on China in the future than was the case in the Merkel era.

At the same time, the Federal Republic of Germany could take an important step towards its European partners and the USA, which Merkel’s benevolent China policy was increasingly astonished to see. With such a reorientation of its China policy, Germany might even enable a more uniform pan-European approach, which in turn could also meet with greater interest in the USA. In any case, the bridges to Beijing would not be torn down, which would be inappropriate given China’s growing geo-economic and geopolitical role.

Guiding principle of a new China policy

With the “Build Back Better World” plan of the US government, the “Clean Green Initiative” of Great Britain and the “Global Gateway” of the European Union, three different global infrastructure programs are currently being launched to support China’s gigantic “New Silk Road “To oppose something. Here the principle of more competition with China seems to have already established itself.

Accordingly, the new federal government should break away from the triad of partners, competitors and system rivals better today than tomorrow. In particular, it should expand the idea of ​​China as a competitor beyond its previous focus on the economic area – and raise the idea to become the guiding principle of its new German China policy.

The author: Sebastian Biba is a China scientist at the Institute for Political Science at the Goethe University in Frankfurt.

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