Europe needs a defense union

There is only one consensus on one point: no American soldier will risk his life for Ukraine. Kyiv will not become a second Kabul. Anyone who knows these facts should be prepared for the fact that the transatlantic unity recently invoked at the Munich Security Conference does not necessarily have to last.

Russia’s illegal attack on Ukraine shook the rule-based world order and thus also the foundations of German and European foreign policy. America’s strategic focus on Asia, Biden’s weakness in leadership and the threatening return of Putin admirer Donald Trump to the White House should finally make people on the old continent realize that, despite Washington’s current involvement in the Ukraine crisis, we Europeans cannot rely on the United States as we have up to now .

Europe should be able to defend itself

Even before the hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan, the world power seemed battered. In addition, the USA has long been concentrating on the conflict of the century with China, which has also become a military rival – and on its national interests. Therefore, Europe should finally work towards being able to defend itself.

It is to be welcomed that the federal government is now investing more in our security. As Washington has long warned, it wants to spend at least two percent of economic output on the military in the future. In addition, there is the special fund of 100 billion euros, which, however, should not primarily pay tribute to the US’s shaky promise of protection. Rather, the money must be invested in our own military capabilities, also in order to keep technical and industrial know-how in Europe.

The federal government should commit to the Franco-German role as a motor for core Europe, with all initiatives being open to other European states. It needs a driving force, because the security policy path towards a defense union – it was last taken in the early 1950s, but then foundered on the veto of the French National Assembly – will not happen in lockstep, especially since self- and foreign blockades have to be overcome.

The armaments industries must cooperate

After all, Berlin and Paris agreed on a common foreign and security policy in the Aachen Treaty in 2019. In order to strengthen military cooperation and pave the way to a European defense union, the treaty states that close cooperation between the armaments industries is necessary. In the light of the turning point brought about by Putin, the festive speeches must finally be followed by deeds: Berlin and Paris must develop a concept for a common European security policy.

As far as cooperation between the armaments industries is concerned, Europe could, for example, shoulder the planned Future Combat Air System (FCAS), which is intended to replace the outdated Eurofighter and Rafale combat aircraft, on its own – even if the costs are in the hundreds of billions. To ensure that FCAS does not end up in political cloud cuckoo land, the economic interests of the previously competing German and French companies must first be balanced. Without a strengthened Berlin-Paris axis and pan-European financial cooperation incentives for the armaments industries of other countries, it cannot be ruled out that FCAS will fail.

Washington, on the other hand, is unlikely to be interested in the success of European armament initiatives and defense structures. After all, should the FCAS project be successful, the Europeans would reduce not only their military but also their technological dependence on the US and strengthen their own sovereignty. Washington wants the Europeans to spend more money on the military – but above all on American armaments. The US political-military complex does not like to see allies becoming technologically independent.

The issue of nuclear sharing needs to be resolved

This becomes particularly clear when replacing German Tornado fighter jets, which Washington consciously links to the power issue of “nuclear sharing”. In an emergency, Berlin could probably not use the Eurofighter to transport the tactical US nuclear weapons stationed in Büchel, but would have to buy an American weapon system to stay under the US nuclear umbrella. As long as the federal government continues nuclear sharing, it ultimately delegates decision-making about Germany’s national security to the respective incumbent in the White House.

At the same time, it gives him powerful leverage, which is increasingly being used to capitalize on the political promise of protection, also economically. The contentious issue of nuclear participation should be clarified with the USA and in the North Atlantic Alliance as quickly as possible: With Biden’s intended limitation of nuclear deterrence to exclusively nuclear threats – the so-called “Sole Purpose” strategy of the USA – the European NATO countries would have to develop their own anyway Fundamentally rethink deterrence strategy against non-nuclear threats.

However, a joint Franco-German foreign and security policy should also extend to nuclear deterrence. After all, Paris is quite prepared – as it was in the days of President Charles de Gaulle – to incorporate its nuclear protection into an overall European strategy, i.e. as a European pillar within NATO. Germany’s participation in the “Force de Frappe” would probably bring more security than the “nuclear participation” dominated by the USA.

If Germany, as the strongest economy in Europe, linked its security policy fate to France, which was more powerful militarily, then, unlike in the past, concerns about Berlin’s aspirations to become a great power would finally be dispelled on the European continent. That would be a valuable psychological contribution to the necessary European security union.

More: Germany needs a new foreign policy