A hasty resumption of conscription does not strengthen defensive capability

The author

Kersten Lahl is a retired lieutenant general and was president of the Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin.

(Photo: Imago, dpa)

Conscription shaped the character of the Bundeswehr for decades. Two goals were paramount from the start: firstly, to strengthen defense planning within the alliance, and secondly, to involve the armed forces in society.

In retrospect, both were achieved surprisingly well. One rightly spoke of a successful model. However, the end of the Cold War and a completely new geostrategic situation opened up a debate that ultimately led to the suspension of conscription in 2011.

Some problems, which the two Federal Presidents Richard von Weizsäcker and Roman Herzog had pointed out at an early stage, simply became overpowering: the unresolved question of military justice, the ever-shorter periods of military service with at most only marginal military earnings, the fixation of the troops on foreign deployments without those doing basic military service and finally the small defense budget.

A point had been reached where there was no resistance to radical change across almost all parties. A conscript army became a volunteer army, labeled as an operational army – with unclear consequences for Germany’s security as well as for the self-image and the social position of the Bundeswehr.

Three aspects are important with regard to conscription

And now Germany faces the challenge of a “turning point”. War is again a reality in the middle of Europe. The phase of illusions, which began in the euphoria of the 1990s and finally broke up exactly a year ago, has given way to bitter disillusionment.

If you take this paradigm shift seriously, everything has to be put to the test – including the question of the type of defense. Admittedly, this is where it gets difficult. A comprehensive turnaround cannot be achieved overnight. Rather, a clear sequence of priorities is required.

If you want to eliminate all deficiencies at the same time, you are in danger of failing everywhere. This raises the question of whether a hasty resumption of conscription today really strengthens defense capability or whether a more comprehensive approach might be more appropriate in the medium term.

There are three aspects in particular to consider:

  1. The time factor

    In the current highly explosive security situation, the Bundeswehr cannot meet the requirements or at best with great difficulty – through no fault of its own, but that is not what matters now.

    The troops currently have far more important things to do than building new structures to integrate thousands of conscripts. To burden it with new tasks now of all times is only at the expense of undeniable alliance obligations.

  2. The cost factor

    Conscripts must be registered, mustered, drafted, dismissed. They need shelter, clothing, equipment and training. Halfway usable, they serve the army only briefly – then a costly loop starts from the beginning.

    All of this necessitates investments that are also being called for in many other areas, such as social or energy policy, during the “turn of the era”. The financial power of the state is likely to be overwhelmed, especially after the pandemic. A “boom” or “double boom” cannot be repeated at will.

  3. The gender factor

    Previously, conscription only applied to men. In the meantime, the understanding of equality has rightly changed. A passionate, open-ended discussion about whether women should also be conscripted is inevitable.

    At the same time, aspects of a reasonable length of military service and acceptable military justice come to light again. The decisive criterion for conscription is not a dogmatic principle, but the necessary gain in security.

A general obligation to serve would include all security-related areas

However, one should not be misled by such objections. In principle, the defense policy and also – albeit not the sole determining factor – social advantages of conscription are obvious.

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But this requires an overall concept that goes well beyond military issues. The modern approach of an “extended security policy” opens up opportunities here.

So why not think of a general compulsory service that includes all security-related areas (from the Bundeswehr to disaster control and development service) as well as traditional civilian service, leaving those affected largely to themselves where exactly they can and want to get involved?

That also costs money and time. But it would certainly be a worthwhile investment in the future and stability of our country. This would come close to the thesis of the military reformer Gerhard von Scharnhorst: “Every citizen of a state is a born defender of it.”

The author: Kersten Lahl is a retired lieutenant general and was president of the Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin.

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