Coalition negotiations after federal elections are an Eldorado for negotiation and game theorists. The more complex and apparently inscrutable, the more interesting. The negotiations in the 2017 election year were already extremely exciting. Experts could hardly see how the Union, Greens and FDP systematically drove them to the wall.
After all, the actors seem to have learned. It has been recognized that it is not only the negotiation structure that matters for the success of the whole thing, but that an optimal negotiation structure also optimizes one’s own negotiating power.
Ideally, this results in a real two-stage negotiation process in which the Greens and FDP first formulate a common position and common demands, and only in a second step enter into talks with the SPD or the Union.
In the last 20 years nobody has wedged themselves nastier than the Greens and the FDP. I hope the Greens leave their old left at home for the preliminary auditions this time. In 2017, Jürgen Trittin, who was actually already marginalized, was pushed into the front line in the role of the skeptical no-sayer in order to signal to the Union: “You have to get past him first.”
Kingmakers not at the cat table
In a different negotiating situation it would be a wise move to use the biggest skeptics as “barriers to negotiation”, but not when negotiating with three players. In 2017, this led to quasi-bilateral negotiations between the Union and the Greens and drove the FDP to the cat table – which, as is well known, then broke everything.
Today the FDP and the Greens would in any case be the parties to break new ground in a new government. If the two partners agree on the core of an agenda, a momentum can arise that both the possible chancellor party – be it the SPD or the CDU – and their own base would find it difficult to counter.
The Greens and the FDP can address their differences bilaterally and define common solutions much more easily. I can only recommend you to look for topics where one side is really passionate about something, but the other side does not have the corresponding negative attitude towards this topic. On this basis, both must be able to really shine in individual cases, instead of looking for lukewarm compromises everywhere. A lot could be achieved in the areas of climate and taxes.
When it comes to climate protection, the “how much” is important to the Greens, the “how” is more important to the FDP. If the two agree on a “Paris Plus” target based on holistic European certificate trading, a first anchor would be set. In taxes, the cold progression is the potential intersection of the two.
Mr. Lindner just needs to set a clear focus point, so that the entry into the top tax rate is set in relation to the salaries, as the SPD and the Greens themselves determined almost 20 years ago. That would mean that the top tax rate would only apply from 80,000 euros instead of below 60,000 euros, as was previously the case.
Marcus Schreiber is a founding partner and Chief Executive Officer at TWS Partners. He has many years of experience in strategic purchasing and broad industry know-how. His focus is on strategic purchasing, applied industrial economics and market design. He also supports companies in applying game theory knowledge in complex awarding decisions.
Olaf Scholz: Lost negotiating power externally, gained internally
In negotiation theory, the quality of one’s own alternatives determines the structure and the result of the negotiation – which is relevant on two levels for the coalition negotiations and the SPD.
Of course, because of Scholz’s popularity in the Chancellor question and the gains compared to 2017, the SPD is the natural negotiating partner of the two smaller ones. The CDU remains an option, even if Mr. Laschet has continued to shrink in public perception since Sunday evening. But one option remains an option for the Greens and the FDP – and this gives both enormous bargaining power or, to put it the other way round, weakens the position of the SPD, especially if the CDU would swallow almost all the demands of the future coalition partners just to stay in power.
During the election campaign, Scholz did not want to rule out red-red-green.
(Photo: dpa)
With the election result, Scholz lost negotiating alternatives, but gained negotiating power within the party. Although the prospect of the left’s participation in government fueled the Union’s final spurt once again, he did not rule out red-red-green. This option would have put him in the position to determine the structure of the explorations and ultimately to give the FDP an ultimatum.
Nevertheless, I doubt that Scholz is too sad that this option is not available to him now. Everyone in the SPD knows that the Union will only provide the Chancellor if the SPD cannot come to an agreement with the FDP – a fantastic instrument of discipline for Scholz against his party, which has so far stabbed each of its leaders in the back.
CDU / CSU: Weaken the bargaining power of the SPD
And the Union? Apart from the fact that she should decide as quickly as possible whether she should fully support Laschet until a government is formed or make Söder her face, she should in no way try to pull the negotiations against the dynamics of public opinion, but above all Scholz’s bargaining power weaken compared to the FDP. Söder invented the word “offer order” for this.
I would be clearer and would say in no uncertain terms, “The Union only has the right to the Chancellery if the SPD messes it up”. That increases the pressure on Scholz. Either the traffic light negotiations fail, and then the acceptance of a Union-led Chancellery increases, or the SPD and FDP ultimately come to an agreement on the basis of painful compromises, which in turn gives the Union the space for programmatic renewal and to win back many voters.
In plain language, if the Union plays it well, it can even draw a strategic advantage for the future from the disaster.
Although it is part of the job profile of a top politician to think and negotiate strategically in order to represent Germany’s interests appropriately, such a way of thinking is rather frowned upon in the public under the category of “power games”. Therefore, the factual toughness in the struggle for negotiating sovereignty and structure must be dressed with even more charm; or as the Latins said: “Fortiter in re, suaviter in modo” – tough in the matter, mild in the form.
More: “Sound out quickly”: What lessons the Greens and FDP draw from 2017