Johannesburg It was the German Chancellor at the time, Helmut Schmidt, who, when asked about Russia’s level of development, described it as “Upper Volta with nuclear missiles”. Upper Volta, the former name of today’s Burkina Faso.
With the catchy comparison, Schmidt wanted to ironically point out the deep gulf between the bitter poverty of the simple Russians on the one hand and the (nuclear) armament of the huge empire on the other – the enormous contrast between claim and reality.
While the gross domestic product generated by its 145 million people still ranks eleventh worldwide according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the country ranks 68th in terms of per capita income, even behind countries such as Romania. Russia is not a developed industrial country, but a mediocre emerging country that draws its international position from one characteristic alone: its armament with nuclear weapons.
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In the list of countries with the highest arms spending, Russia ranks fourth behind the clearly dominant USA, as well as China and India.
Three decades after the end of the Soviet Union and two decades after Putin came to power, the balance sheet is deeply sobering. The Russian economy is weak and not very innovative; almost nothing is made in Russia that the world could use. Export sales beyond raw materials and, in part, weapons are correspondingly low.
Gas station in the world – with a bistro in front
Instead, Putin’s empire has joined the global division of labor as a pure supplier of raw materials and food and has thus committed itself to an economic system that is based almost exclusively on the exploitation of its natural resources. At the same time, Moscow has to import almost all of its technology needs.
The politics professor Philip Manow from the University of Bremen has therefore also described Russia as the “gas station” of the global economy with a “bistro area” in front of it.
In this way, the country does not resemble great powers such as the USA and China, with which it competes for power and influence on an equal footing, but much more like those African states that are among the losers in the global economic order. Because an authoritarian ruling elite consumes what they bring in from their commodity sales.
Many African countries can see that this is not a path towards prosperity and power, but rather a downward spiral of economic and political development. It has long since caught on in Russia – and will continue to pull the country down economically and socially. The Ukraine war is only a trend accelerator, not a trigger.
The African and Russian models are more similar than it might seem at first glance: there is hardly any manufacturing industry of their own – and if there is, then it is at the most basic technological level and almost only to supply their own population with a few essential consumer items.
What Russia has in common with many African countries
After all, many African states and Russia also share political authoritarianism, the tendency towards macho leadership by so-called “big men”. In Africa, this tendency has not turned outwards in a military-aggressive manner only because the colonial borders were codified as sacrosanct at the time the Organization for African Unity was founded in 1963; this was also respected, apart from the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and South Sudan from Sudan.
In this respect, Moscow’s foreign policy in Africa is on familiar, fertile ground. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has concentrated on just under a dozen of the 54 African states.
In international competition on the continent, Russia is a tiny thing, states Professor Gerrit Olivier, South Africa’s first ambassador to Russia since 1992.
It is true that Russia’s interventions in Africa have a long tradition: During the Cold War, Moscow supported Marxist-Leninist-inspired resistance movements across the continent. But while China has grown into a major trade and investment partner for Africa in recent decades, Russia only has something to offer a few conflict-ridden states. Olivier believes that Russia’s presence and role in Africa are too insignificant, now and in the future, to gain any major influence.
This is also due to the fact that Russia almost only promotes conflicts in Africa instead of development and peace. Russia’s trade with Africa is largely limited to arms and military adviser services, and the sale of wheat or fertilizer.
John Bolton, Donald Trump’s White House National Security Adviser, has described Russia’s military involvement in Africa as an “exploitative practice” which, as in the case of Angola, South Africa or Zimbabwe, is often based on Cold War alliances – arms sales in exchange for Africa’s support in the UN, combined with the attempt to keep authoritarian leaders in power and thereby undermine almost all sustainable development.
Since 2015, Russia has signed more than 20 bilateral military cooperation agreements with African countries. With a share of 35 percent, Russia has now become Africa’s largest arms supplier. Russian weapons are attractive to Africa because they are cheaper than American ones.
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In contrast, Russia’s non-military trade with Africa has increased only slightly and is marginal compared to China’s volume. Exchanges with Russia account for only about 2 percent of African trade with countries outside the continent; the volume of trade with Europe and China is more than ten times larger. In 2018, the total volume of Russian trade with sub-Saharan Africa was a full five billion dollars – less than trade with Turkey, Singapore or Thailand.
On the losing side of the international division of labor
Accordingly, Russia has long played the role in Africa that threatens it worldwide: as a mediocre regional power that prefers to ally itself with the losers in the African world.
The presidential candidate favored by Moscow was recently unable to assert itself in Madagascar or the Congo. The attempt to keep long-time Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir in office failed, as did a secretly negotiated deal to supply nuclear power plants to South Africa. And the withdrawal of Russian mercenaries from Mozambique, where they fought unsuccessfully against the Islamists in the north, is further evidence of the manifold problems of the Russian development model in other parts of the world.
Russia’s fate is reflected in two ways in Africa: as an imitator of the bad example set by many African countries economically. And as a pseudo-giant who can hardly exert any influence even among economic dwarfs.
More: Famine and Unrest: How the Ukraine War Threatens Africa.