In an interview, Mr. Haun discusses the pressing need for a more unified European defense strategy amidst current security challenges. He highlights the obstacles to integration, primarily driven by national interests and the complexity of existing military systems. Despite some progress, particularly with Germany’s collaborative efforts on battle tanks, he stresses the urgency for a streamlined approach to enhance deterrent capabilities. Haun reflects on the diminished military readiness of European nations since the Cold War and emphasizes the importance of reevaluating defense spending priorities. He calls for a clearer commitment from the government to bolster the Bundeswehr and improve procurement processes, while acknowledging the necessity of open dialogue with political leaders.
Reflections on European Defense and Unity
Mr. Haun, your departure aligns with a pivotal moment in the European security landscape. What thoughts do you have regarding this transition?
I believe we need to embrace a bold vision for a more unified Europe, particularly in defense. A Europe that is better equipped and deterrent, supported by a cohesive industrial base, is essential.
The Challenges of European Defense Integration
Having led the European defense firm KNDS for several years, what do you think hinders the progress of European integration in the defense sector?
The main barriers stem from national interests and a failure to recognize that shared systems would enhance Europe’s deterrent capabilities. Standardized systems can reduce costs, streamline logistics, and foster interoperability among European armed forces, thereby strengthening our collective combat readiness. Currently, our landscape is filled with unnecessary complexity due to the vast array of systems in use.
Despite decades of discussion, do you see a prospect for change in this landscape during your lifetime?
There are emerging initiatives, particularly from Germany, where we’ve established framework agreements for the Leopard battle tank that involve collaboration from other nations. A growing recognition of the need to move beyond individual national requests is evident.
Where is this issue most pressing?
Europe currently hosts seventeen different types of battle tanks, along with numerous variants. While I don’t wish to stifle competition, consolidating to perhaps three main types could greatly simplify operations and bolster our deterrent as well as endurance capacities.
After two decades in arms management, how do you view the current security climate in Europe compared to previous decades?
The threat is significantly greater now. In the aftermath of the Cold War, there was a dramatic reduction in military capabilities across Europe, with resources shifted to social programs. Today, many nations, including Germany, find themselves less capable than they were 30 or 40 years ago, with few exceptions.
How does this assessment relate to the current state of the Bundeswehr?
The Bundeswehr’s challenges can largely be attributed to a denial of reality within segments of the political landscape. The era of the ‘peace dividend’ is over; we must now focus on maintaining peace against unpredictable, aggressive adversaries. Our priority must be to re-establish effective deterrence, a concept that still needs to be fully embraced by all stakeholders.
What improvements have you observed in the Bundeswehr’s procurement processes since recent changes?
There’s been a noticeable acceleration in the procurement processes, which should have occurred sooner, but it is encouraging to see progress. Nevertheless, I believe there is still much work to be done to enhance the capabilities of the army. Germany is fundamentally a land power, and the current prioritization of air and naval forces in defense spending does not reflect this reality. While plans for adjustment exist, they depend on stable financing.
Given the current uncertainties regarding funding, how optimistic are you about future changes?
Internal and external security must be the top priorities for any government. This is the foundation upon which all other policies are built. Public sentiment indicates a recognition of this need, as surveys have shown. We must do more for the Bundeswehr.
Despite two decades of discussions, significant changes remain elusive. The ongoing transfer of arms to Ukraine has further weakened the Bundeswehr. The conflict has been ongoing since 2014, not just since 2022.
From my perspective, the warning signs were evident as early as 2007 when I witnessed Vladimir Putin’s chilling challenge at the Munich Security Conference. It was clear then that Russia was not a friend.
What would it take for Germany to awaken from its defense policy slumber?
A more powerful wake-up call seems necessary. While there are tentative movements towards change, they are insufficient given the current threat landscape. We need a sustainable and enduring approach. The public recognizes the need for a stronger Bundeswehr; the challenge lies in deciding whether to incur more debt or reallocate existing budget items.
What would be your approach: increase national debt or prioritize budget allocations differently?
This is not merely a question of fiscal policy. As Henry Kissinger once suggested, the key question for any government is: What objectives are non-negotiable, and what must be avoided? Clarity on these points is essential for aligning subsequent actions.
What objectives do you think must be prioritized?
The electorate is seeking security over superficial politics. They understand that achieving security may require sacrifices in other areas, a realization that has yet to permeate the political climate in Berlin.
Since the recent shifts, have you experienced greater access to political channels?
Absolutely, access has improved significantly.
How many times have you met with Chancellor Olaf Scholz in this timeframe?
Two or three times, but what is more important is the overall accessibility now available. If you seek dialogue, appointments can be arranged, including with ministers. Economic Minister Robert Habeck has reached out to discuss secure supply chains for critical materials, and Defense Minister Boris Pistorius is much more approachable than his predecessors. This trend of purposeful communication is encouraging.
How do you view the government’s performance amid such a challenging security environment?
While I’m not a politician and won’t judge them outright, sometimes a difficult conclusion is preferable to an endless struggle.
What are your expectations for the new government?
I anticipate they will address the critical questions posed by Kissinger. The notion of having it all without the necessary resources is untenable.
Germany’s defense capabilities are intimately tied to the arms industry, which is progressing slowly. When can we expect the delivery of the first new Leopard tank for the Bundeswehr?
What is contracted will be delivered by KNDS, as per our agreements. While the pace may appear slow, it’s noteworthy considering that our industry has had to downsize over the past 30 years due to reduced defense budgets.
How many suppliers are involved in the tank manufacturing process?
The number is quite large—four digits. However, we currently have only one supplier for tank steel, located in Sweden. While our supply chains remain stable, we do require increased volume in this area.
Given the high demand for battle tanks within NATO, what needs to happen for you to increase production and stockpile tanks?
We cannot build tanks in stock as they are classified as weapons of war. Each tank requires a manufacturing permit from the state. If the federal government grants this permission and assures a contractual commitment for future acquisition, I can proceed with production. However, the financial risk of stockpiling hundreds of tanks is considerable, and no company can shoulder that without a guarantee from the state.
There are claims that Russia produces more weaponry in three months than Europe does in an entire year. How is this possible?
The veracity of this claim is uncertain. If it were accurate, we might still see Bashar al